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AbstrAct
The article aims to describe in detail the essence of the Security and Prosperity Partnership 
(SPP), interpreting it as an initiative to overcome disfunctionalities and shortcomings of pre-
vious international arrangements among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The spp failed 
to deliver the results that its initiators had in mind; its outputs were limited in scope measured 
in terms of the issues tackled, joint policies, and regional regimes. It brought some policy inte-
gration into North America beyond economic issues, but did not transform itself into a regional 
governance mechanism that would bring about self-regulation norms and structures.
Key words: North American integration, regional governance, Security and Prosperity Part-
nership.
resumen
Este artículo pretende describir detalladamente la esencia de la Alianza para la Seguridad y la 
Prosperidad en América del Norte (aspan), a la cual interpreta como una iniciativa para encu-
brir las disfuncionalidades y deficiencias de los acuerdos previos entre Estados Unidos, Cana-
dá y México. La aspan no pudo dar los resultados que sus iniciadores tenían en mente; en realidad 
éstos fueron limitados si se miden en términos de temas abordados, políticas conjuntas y crea-
ción de regímenes regionales. Sí trajo consigo cierto grado de integración de políticas públicas 
en Norteamérica más allá de los asuntos económicos, pero no llegó a ser un mecanismo de go-
bernanza regional que incluyera normas y estructuras de autorregulación.
Palabras clave: Integración norteamericana, gobernanza regional, Alianza para la Seguridad y 
la Prosperidad en América del Norte.
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IntroductIon
In 2005, the Security and Prosperity Partnership (spp) emerged in the North Ameri-
can institutional landscape as a yet another device to organize and facilitate trilateral 
and bilateral relations with respect to the countries’ economic and security interests. 
The creation of the SPP sparked many expectations and fears about the direction of 
regional integration because it seemed that the federal administrations were taking 
the initiative and had decided to play a more prominent role in governing the social 
and economic integration set in motion years ago. However, the spp’s organization 
and results proved wrong for both its opposition and supporters, exposing the vari-
ous weaknesses of North American regionalism: 1) dominant power structures (at 
the regional, national, and bureaucratic level) that foster bilateralism rather than tri-
lateralism; 2) a weak strategic vision or common ideology for successfully compet-
ing with neoliberalism as the basis for regional integration or with national socialist-
based protectionism; and, 3) the lack of institutions to act as advocates of regional 
interests. Nevertheless, the results showed that not everything is gloom and doom, 
and, as in life, some aspects of regional politics do foster further policy integration 
without the political integration of the three states.
The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America emerged in 2005 
during the Waco summit. Three North American leaders launched the initiative, 
calling on their respective federal bureaucracies to seek greater and more intensive 
cooperation.  In the beginning, it was heavily publicized and promoted in all three 
countries. In contrast, its tacit decline and final demise in 2009 passed unheralded, 
suggesting the decay of the spp as a response to interdependence pressures and to 
relation-management shortcomings. 
A lot has already been written about the causes and circumstances of the spp’s 
establishment and closure. It grew out of the structural changes in the global econo-
my and security factors, including China’s entry into the World Trade Organization 
(wto) and subsequent growth, especially in the U.S. market –China replaced Mexi-
co as a secondary U.S. trading partner–, and the September 11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon. In addition, the spp was influenced by changes in 
U.S. geopolitical strategy and domestic homeland security policy (Leycegui Gardo-
qui, 2012: 124-129; Benítez Manaut and Rodríguez Ulloa, 2005: 78-96; Velázquez 
Flores and Schiavon, 2008).  Therefore, from this perspective, the spp can be seen as 
a result of the efforts of Mexican, Canadian, and U.S. business-oriented actors (trade 
and economy departments and firms operating transnationally) to increase region-
al economic liberalization and competitiveness and make them a priority for the three 
countries. At the same time, it can be perceived as an effort to deal with security-related 
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externalities arising from the constructed economic integration of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (nafta), like the massive increase in transborder flows, 
and unilaterally imposed stricter border and immigration measures after the terror-
ist attack. Scholars and even people who took part in the spp have rarely analyzed 
the entrepreneurship, leadership, or power of particular individuals (for example, 
Presidents Fox and Bush or Minister of Trade Carlos Gutiérrez). Surprisingly, the 
decline of the spp is usually ascribed to a personal decision made by Pre sident Obama, 
who did not want to continue projects initiated by President George W. Bush. The 
same was said of Mexican President Calderón and Canadian Prime Minister Harper 
and their disinterest in the spp when they replaced President Fox and Prime Minister 
Paul Martin.
In my analysis, I want to determine other factors inherent to the spp and to the 
management of bilateral and trilateral relations in the North American region in 
order to specify variables that made the spp work for only a few years.
The article is structured as follows: the first part questions and tests popular be-
liefs about the spp; the second describes the characteristics of the spp as a management 
framework and analyzes the changes that it underwent between 2005 and 2009. The 
third part presents evidence that confirms two functions of the spp (the governance 
mechanism and the dialogue/cooperation device), revealing that these aspects were 
always present, though with varying intensity over time with respect to different is-
sues on the spp agenda. Each part consists of two elements: description and evaluation.
 
theoretIcAl And conceptuAl ApproAch
It is my opinion that the spp was a management framework applied to bilateral and 
trilateral intergovernmental relations, which from 2005 to 2009 organized and shaped 
the way those complex relationships were handled. This framework had two func-
tions: sometimes it operated as governance (the governing process), while at other 
times it was a mechanism for cooperation and communication.
The management framework concept refers to the style or method of organiz-
ing the time and work of the governments of Canada, the U.S., and Mexico, to pro-
mote and achieve their goals with respect to each other and North America. This 
concept relates to the ways the agenda (needs/interests and objectives) was shaped, 
how inputs were directed to achieve the objectives, which activities were chosen as 
part of the agenda, which methods of monitoring, evaluation, and measurement of 
advances were included, and how outputs of the process and their results were eval-
uated. It was also a method for planning, directing, implementing, monitoring, con-
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trolling, and evaluating joint or coordinated actions. Obviously, management frame-
works focus on delivering desired change. Looking at the spp as a management 
framework enables us to see its weak and strong points and determine the factors 
that contributed to its success and failure.
The management framework concept used here is strongly inspired by Leon 
Lindberg’s theory of political integration (1970). Lindberg defines political integra-
tion as a collective decision-making process that not only covers making policy 
choices but also collectively implementing them. So he argues that it is not only 
about collective process but also about collective outcomes of this process when the 
decisions made together are binding. He also argues that there is a causal relationship 
between the system and organization of collective policymaking and political inte-
gration of a region.
This article analyzes the Security and Prosperity Partnership as a management 
framework in order to explain the fundamental aspects of international political pro-
cesses: the mechanics and dynamics of political decision-making, the maintenance 
of diplomatic relations, and policy outcomes.
From the perspective of trans-governmental regional governance, the spp can be 
seen as a set of mechanisms and relations among various levels of executives in three 
North American countries set in motion in order to establish common regulations aimed 
at strengthening security and improving competitiveness in the region as a whole. 
From another angle, the spp can be seen as an instrument to build and maintain 
relationships at the regional level. Its aim was to structure and promote dialogue 
and cooperation (not regulations, as in the previous case), to improve inter-govern-
mental understanding, to generate a sense of shared responsibility, and to prevent 
unilateral action that could harm other partners in the region. 
How do these basic terms that can be applied to the spp (governance mechanism 
and communication/cooperation devices) relate to each other? Governance is the 
process and activity of governing; it is intentional behavior that imposes ideational, 
behavioral, and institutional order (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Bevir, 2012).
Cooperation, on the other hand, means working together to achieve any goal. 
Communication is an exchange of ideas, which does not necessarily involve convinc-
ing others of our ideas or making others think and act accordingly. Cooperation and 
communication are broader concepts than governance. Using power and imposing 
authority is inherent to governance, cooperation, and communication, though they are 
not power-free relations: they are not acts of governing, of displaying authority. 
Cooperation/communication is part of governance, but not all cooperation/
communication aims to create order (patterned behavior, an arrangement of social 
positions, or the corresponding norms and ideas that endure over longer periods of 
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time). Communication/cooperation can serve practical, temporary, ordinary goals like 
working together during a disaster or to catch a criminal or build a bridge.  Coopera-
tion/communication can be a component of order as a value, as a desired behavior, as a 
dominant practice, or even a formalized practice. Governance impacts human behav-
ior by constraining and enabling people to act in a desired way. It provides an intended 
and effective self-regulation of the social system, but cooperation/communication is 
not necessarily successful in pursuing its goals.
In this article, I argue that the spp documents as well as its actions prove its dual 
function and its nature as an intergovernmental relations management framework. 
We can find examples of the harmonization and regionalization of policies, but at the 
same time we can find periods and initiatives that were limited to commissioning 
research and exercises to prepare for a natural disaster. 
The spp’s complex nature made it difficult for North American academics to eval-
uate its meaning and place in regional processes. I propose criteria with which we can 
judge the spp’s achievements and failures. They correspond to each of its features: man-
agement framework, governance mechanism, and cooperation/communication de-
vice. First, I look at management practices with special attention to the principles and 
organization of the spp’s work to assess the following: whether they were legitimate 
and accountable processes, whether they functioned in more effective and efficient 
ways then previous arrangements, and whether they were able to achieve the aims of 
the partnership. After this, I focus on governance practices and their productivity and 
effectiveness by examining the outputs of the spp process such as the origin and nature 
of documents produced (unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, trilateral, or legally, politi-
cally binding); further, I assess the rules with respect to their flexibility, scope, depth, 
and their impact on different social categories like bureaucracy, economic sectors, and 
population. Finally, the inputs are evaluated in terms of the results and outcomes they 
produced in the region and in particular countries. The next part of the article explores 
aspects of the spp that encourage and strengthen dialogue and cooperation. I focus on 
networks and joint projects that, thanks to the spp, emerged and grew. I describe how 
the spp enhanced and sped up interactions, how it generated new networks and estab-
lished a regional norm and sectoral and problem-driven communication. 
nAture of the spp: lIterAture revIew
The first step is to analyze the critics of the spp and question their claims. Then, I will 
compare the claims with the facts related to the political process within the spp, its 
decisions, functions, and results. 
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The most prevalent attack on the spp is for its informality, which limited the ini-
tiative’s transparency and accountability. Critics claim that the spp was not governed 
by legal procedures or by international legal agreements (Van Landingham, 2009; 
Preciado Coronado, 2009; Zamora, 2011). This is a partially valid point, because treaties 
did not guide the transnational actions of each country’s representatives. However, 
they were limited by each governmental institution’s internal regulations, so they 
were not acting without regulations.
It is worth mentioning that the biggest criticism of the spp’s informality, the con-
stant accusation that the spp is being handled behind closed doors, has not been made 
about bilateral initiatives between U.S. and Mexico, the U.S. and Canada, or Mexico 
and Canada, such as the Partnership for Prosperity, the Canada-Mexico Partnership, the 
Smart Border Accords, and the U.S. Canada Partnership Forum. This criticism seems 
absurd in the larger context of media and congressional scrutiny and the interest in the 
spp compared to the attention that has been paid to many informal interactions and 
networks existing in the region. Furthermore, how can something be secretive when, 
immediately after meetings and conferences, the media reported on the proceedings?
The accountability in the spp involved ministers and federal officers who were re-
sponsible for their actions before their presidents and prime minister. The leaders of the 
three countries set up an agenda and a list of objectives each year. These guided how 
their secretaries, ministers, and expert working groups should function. Often the de-
liverables were also specified (Grant and Keohane, 2005). Federal government officials 
worked within the legal boundaries that divide legislative end executive powers.
Governments, especially the entities responsible for the prosperity aspect of the 
spp, wanted to be more accountable and responsive to their stakeholders and con-
stituencies. They made the effort to institutionalize this relationship by creating the 
North American Competitiveness Council to get feedback about the spp’s perfor-
mance. From a broader perspective, the partnership reflected a limited view of pros-
perity as existing solely in the economic sphere and not including aspects like social 
well-being and development. However, the three countries recognized that they 
should work with those who could be affected by their policies.
Although the spp was an international political process, it was implemented by 
national governments (not foreign or international institutions), and government ac-
tions could still be controlled and evaluated just like any other measure taken by 
national authorities. They were hardly used with respect to the spp in all three countries.1
1  In all three countries only a few hearings were held to demand information about the spp and evaluate the 
administrations’ work: in Canada, three hearings: Canada, 39th Parliament, House of Commons, the Health 
Committee,  June 4, 2007; Standing Committee on International Trade, April 24 2007; Standing Committee 
on International Trade, May 10, 2007.
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The criticism from the legislatures about informality and poor accountability 
could be read as a cry for more power rather than a legitimate claim that decisions 
made within the spp fall under the purview of sole or joint prerogatives of the legisla-
ture. Furthermore, there was nothing that prevented them from exercising their power 
to evaluate executive performance. In each country, hearings were held, and admin-
istration representatives were questioned.
Unfortunately, congresspersons never questioned one prevalent activity in the 
spp: information sharing (for example, about airline passengers). They were preoc-
cupied with issues like energy in Mexico, water in Canada, or superhighways in the 
U.S., which were supposed to be negotiated within the spp. Meanwhile, they ignored 
issues that had a tremendous impact on civil rights, including exchanging informa-
tion about citizens and non-citizens, that probably should be the subject of a treaty 
requiring legislative approval (Almazan, n.d.; Cámara de Diputados, 2006; House of 
Commons, 2007a; Congressional Record, 2007). This was what happened when the 
U.S. wanted information about the passengers flying from EU countries, and so they 
negotiated an agreement with the European Commission. 
The second important criticism of the spp claims that the process was illegiti-
mate and undemocratic (Ayres and Macdonald, 2012; Council of Canadians, n.d.). 
In the United States, the spp was evaluated several times, but no hearing was solely dedicated to it: 
Hearing before the hr Committee on Science, February 15, 2006, An overview of the federal R&D Budget for 
fiscal year 2007, p. 89; Hearing before the hr Committee on Homeland Security, July 14 and 25, 2005, The 
Secretary’s second-stage review: re-thinking the department of homeland security’s organization and policy direction; 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on  Management, Integration, and Oversight November 15, 2005 and 
May 11 2006, cbp and ice: does the current organizational structure best serve U.S. Homeland security interests?; 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 12, 2005, North American Cooperation on the 
border; Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 2005, April 20, 
2005, and April 28, 2005, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006; Full field hear-
ing of the hr Committee on Homeland Security, July 20, 2007, The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative: per-
spectives of a community on the U.S. Canada border; Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security 
and Foreign Affairs, March 11, 2008, National security and Latin America: Challenges and opportunities on en-
ergy co-operation; Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and International Trade, April 12, 2007, Pi-
rating the American Dream: intellectual property theft’s impact on America’s place in the global economy and 
strategies for improving enforcement; Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee, March 1, 2007, Commerce, Justice, science and related agencies appropriations for fiscal year 2008; Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Emerging, Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, October 27, 
2009, Real-time assessment of the federal response to pandemic influenza; Hearing before a subcommittee of the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, May 13, 2009, Department of the Interior, the Environment, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010; In the United States, the state governments expressed their will 
and demanded that the federal government cease the spp process; the request were sent to the Senate by 
Idaho (Congressional Record, Senate, 2007b), Montana (Congressional Record, Senate, 2007a), Georgia 
(Congressional Record, Senate, 2008b) , Utah (Congressional Record, Senate, 2008a). 
In Mexico, immediately after the spp was announced, the Joint Foreign Relations and Foreign Relations 
(North America) Commissions demanded a study of the spp. Later legislatures sporadically called the prin-
cipals of foreign affairs agencies and economy departments to testify (Cámara de Diputados, Centro de 
Documentación, Información y Análisis, 2010, 2008, 2007, and 2006). 
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Again, this is a constitutional question about what types of matters require joint ac-
tion by the executive and the legislature: what is the margin of autonomy in the 
government? How does the delegation work, and what issues should be negotiated 
with citizens even after elections?
Here, I would like to present an alternative view of the spp that has not been dis-
cussed and that gives us different arguments about the legitimacy of actions taken 
by the three heads of state and about the spp accountability model based on the prin-
ciple idea of modern democracies: the delegation of power.  
Presidents Fox and Bush and Premier Paul Martin (and their successors) were 
democratically elected. The power to define state policy and govern was delegated 
to them according to the framework specified by their respective national Constitu-
tions. In the three countries, the executive has different kinds and degrees of autono-
my, and the Constitutions stipulate its legal boundaries. If someone says that their 
actions were illegitimate with regard to the spp or that they were not democratic or 
lacked accountability, they undermine the political systems of the United States, Mexi-
co, and Canada. It is political opinion, not legal claim that ignores the principle of 
the delegation of power. 
Many institutions that have participated in the spp (federal agencies, departments 
and ministries responsible for public health, agriculture, energy, and trade) have no 
legally grounded responsibilities in the international arena. Their participation in 
the spp was delegated by the first executive in each country; so, their mandate ema-
nates from constitutional prerogatives. 
However the leaders made one questionable decision, which was to give a priv-
ileged position to the business community. They did this by establishing the North 
American Competitiveness Council and ignoring other interest groups that would 
be affected by their decisions (for example, border states) (Brodie, 2008; Gilbert, 2007; 
Healy, 2007). Nevertheless, in Mexico the consultation process was open to any civil 
society agent (sre, n.d.); in Canada government officials also claimed to discuss is-
sues on the SPP agenda with different stakeholders, but in fact the most active and 
warmly embraced by the governments was the North American business sector 
(House of Commons, 2007a, 2007b, and 2007c). This bias reflects a narrow vision of 
the ways prosperity and security are generated and guaranteed, as well as the pow-
er structures in the three societies. But also it reflects the pragmatic side of political 
processes and whether you want to have something done in a timely manner or you 
want to get stuck in constant negotiations with a broad range of interests. Within the 
SPP, the chief executives exercised great pressure to deliver results, which required 
compromises and prioritization. However, politicians and bureaucrats did not ad-
dress all the wishes of big business. 
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The other criticism and fear about the spp relates to the claim that this process 
leads to the North American Union and to diminished national sovereignty (Alma-
zán, 2007; Gonzalez Amador, 2007; Esquivel, 2005; Gafney, 2007; Judicial Watch, 2007; 
Luo, 2007; Savage, 2007; Barlow, 2005; Sandoval Palacios, 2008). This claim, however, 
completely ignores the fact that, thanks to the division of power as well as checks 
and balances, the power of each branch of government in the three countries is lim-
ited. It also disregards the facts about the activities within the spp. 
In order to construct political and economic union, you need agreement between 
the executive and the legislative branches. In the meantime, with the spp the executive 
deliberately decided to reduce the scope and depth of its actions by limiting itself to 
constitutionally established prerogatives. There was no opportunity to pursue ambi-
tious projects, because in order to undertake them, they would have to negotiate with 
the legislatures regarding the budget, domestic laws, and international agreements. 
To put it simply, they could talk about almost everything, but they could do little. 
And this is manifested in the concrete actions taken by the three governments with 
respect to the spp agenda, like protocols and cooperation in times of emergency caused 
by epidemics or natural disaster or pledges to protect intellectual property, though the 
latter were not taken as seriously in Canada as it was in Mexico and in the U.S.
The aforementioned criticism of the spp leads me to ask why anyone would think 
that democratically elected politicians would limit their power and their citizens’ 
autonomy (otherwise known as state sovereignty) and surrender themselves and 
their countries to other actors such as foreign politicians and international corpora-
tions. I argue that this suspicion that presidents and government officials act against 
the will of the people of their respective countries by establishing and perpetuating 
the spp emerges from doubts about the autonomy of politicians from the business 
elites in Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. (Chase, 2011; Savage, 2010; Wikileaks, 2009). 
They are also born of xenophobic stereotypes about other countries and their peo-
ple. For example, the criticism of the spp in the U.S. was inspired by views that Mexi-
co is a corrupt, violent, primitive society with which the U.S. should not be associat-
ed. The same prejudices about Mexico also persist in Canada, even though they were 
diplomatically hidden. Negative perceptions of U.S. Americans as being egotistical 
and obsessed with the capitalist ethos (rather than a sense of community and an ap-
preciation of social policies) and post-9/11 limitations of civil liberties and rights 
were prevalent in the Canadian critiques of the spp. These negative sentiments and 
beliefs about the relations between politicians and the business sector and about 
North American neighbors heavily influenced the way the spp was perceived. In con-
sequence, the analysis and evaluation of the spp were not based on facts but on fears 
and prejudice.
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The other false accusation against the spp relates to the legal nature of the Waco 
declaration (Arley Orduña, 2012: 317-372). In the Waco declaration, U.S., Mexican, 
and Canadian leaders set up a process of communication and cooperation among 
multiple agencies and departments and called it the Security and Prosperity Part-
nership. It is not a treaty, and it does not have all the traits that a legal agreement 
among nations should have in order to be called a treaty (Villiger, 2009:77-79; Dorr 
and Schmalenbach, 2012:879; Corten and Klein, 2011:37-39, 211-212). Not all interna-
tional agreements are treaties according to the Vienna Convention. A treaty must be 
concluded, which means it has to go through all the steps established by domestic 
law referring to treaties. In the case of Canada, the U.S., and Mexico, a treaty must be 
approved by the legislature. By not submitting the Waco declaration to the legisla-
tive vote, the first executives demonstrated that they did not want to treat the docu-
ment as legally binding. Though it was written and signed by heads of state, there is 
no mention that the document is governed by international law (Corten and Klein, 
2011: 41-42). It does not have provisions clearly stipulating the date when it enters 
into force. Furthermore, the Waco document is a political declaration that fits the 
description of the 1962 Memorandum from the un Office of Legal Affairs, which de-
fined a declaration as “a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions 
when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated.”
However it must be added that the rhetoric of the declaration is misleading. 
For example, calling the process the “Security and Prosperity Partnership” evokes 
an entity, an organization. Nevertheless, the spp lacks elements that normally con-
stitute an organization, like a charter with internal regulations and specified com-
petencies. Calling it the spp was a move addressed to bureaucracies and the media, 
not the expression of a will to govern in a new way and subordinate the signees to 
international law.
The last myth about the spp is that it was a technical, depoliticized, and bureau-
cratized process. The spp was not in fact devoid of politics; it was a process where 
different constellations of power were set in motion (Grondin and de Larringa, 2009; 
Craik, 2011; Ackleson and Kastner, 2006). The first constellation was the power struc-
ture of the three economies and states; the second consisted of the bureaucratic ma-
chinery and inherent power relations already existing within them and new ones 
established by the spp; the last constellation was formed by the relationship between 
state and business actors. 
Though there is a tendency to perceive the spp as a depoliticized process run by 
experts working on technical issues because there was little involvement of legisla-
tures and parties in the agenda-setting and decision-making process, this was not 
the case. The reality was much more complex due to the fact that national, institutional, 
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and personal interests were present at domestic and intergovernmental negotiations, 
making the spp a game of “politics as usual” rather than technocratic governance.
Often the literature about the spp has argued that countries’ political elites col-
luded with business elites to jointly attempt to reorganize North America according 
to capitalist interests. In the meantime, the facts do not confirm harmonious rela-
tions between politicians and corporations. The North American Competitiveness 
Council, an auditory and consulting body established by the leaders of North Amer-
ica to accompany the spp, often criticized the unresponsiveness and tardiness of the 
bureaucrats involved in the process. On the other hand, governments sometimes re-
fused to implement their proposals.
What have been omitted in the spp analysis are the consequences of its bureau-
cratic character. The spp architecture created at least three layers of hierarchy that 
were far from cohesive and harmonious in terms of coordination (see Diagrams 1 
and 2). First was the level of leaders and their staff (presidency, Privy Council, Na-
tional Security Council), to whom coordinators of the partnership’s two pillars, se-
curity and prosperity, reported on advances. These were the heads of the Ministries 
of Economy and of the Interior in Mexico, the Departments of Homeland Security 
and Commerce in the U.S., and the Ministries of Industry and Public Safety in Cana-
da.  Economic affairs and public security departments oversaw the performance of 
many federal institutions, like those responsible for agriculture, the environment, 
transport and communications, health, the budget and treasury, migration and bor-
der management, and energy. This created a third layer in the spp, and federal insti-
tutions found themselves in weaker and more subordinate positions. Bureaucratic 
politics constrained the spp process. The status of foreign affairs departments was 
ambiguous and changed over time from 2005 to 2006. They were supporting institu-
tions, and later they gained more power in coordinating both pillars of the partner-
ship and preparation of the North American Leaders Summits.
The stakes and interests of each federal institution involved in the spp in all three 
countries were different, and though it was not very politicized, it was not an en-
tirely technical process devoid of power relations.
the ontology of the spp As A mAnAgement frAmework 
for trIlAterAl And bIlAterAl relAtIons
the context: prevIous mAnAgement models And theIr crItIcIsms
The spp did not emerge out of nothing; long before 2005, both formal and informal 
inter-governmental networks were already shaping and organizing interstate and 
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intergovernmental relations in the region. First, there were trilateral institutions based 
on nafta, the North American Commission for Environmental Protection (naec), 
and North American Commission on Labor Cooperation (nalc) like the Free Trade 
Commission, the Commission on Labor Cooperation, the Commission on Environ-
mental Cooperation, and various working groups and committees (see Table 1) (To-
rres, 2005; Anderson, 2008; Vega Canovas, 2010a). There were other trilateral bodies 
like the North American Energy Working Group (since 2001) and the North American 
Biotechnology Initiative (since 2003).
Bilateral networks and cooperative arrangements were in existence: for exam-
ple, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (since 1958), 
the U.S.-Mexican Binational Commission (since 1981), the Border Vision Initiative 
mechanisms (1997), the Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum (1999), and coordination and 
collaboration mechanisms based on smart border agreements (since 2002, focused 
on security related issues). They emerged from two initiatives: the Canada Mexico Part-
nership (since 2004) and the Partnership for Prosperity of the U.S. and Mexico (since 
2001) (Barry, 2003; Bailey and Guillen Lopez, 2009). 
Besides cooperation frameworks, the three countries’ relations were institution-
alized in a very specific and formal way by procedures of conflict resolution based 
on nafta Chapters 11, 19, and 22 (Vega Canovas, 2005; Morales, 1999).
Before the spp, a dense web of interactions and relations already existed to dis-
cuss, resolve, and work together on North American issues. Their effectiveness and 
efficiency in solving emerging problems and disputes were questionable. They were 
also too weak to prevent violations of existing treaties by any of the countries except 
what was most important to the U.S. And as the past proved, unilateral, shortsighted, 
politicized perspectives remain a constant threat to the regional legal foundations 
and undermine the trust needed to build a common future (Clarkson, 2008).
The instruments and mechanisms available to the three countries were bureau-
cratic, too formal, not flexible enough, and unresponsive to changing contexts. They 
were also politicized and time-consuming (Clarkson, 2008; Vega Canovas, 2010a; 
Capling and Nossal, 2009; Alba, Proud’homme and Vega Canovas, 2007). They per-
petuated the national logic and did not give any chance to voice and defend the re-
gional, North American perspective that would be independent from political trade-
offs, but based on the research and dynamics of integrated economies.
These intergovernmental institutions’ shortcomings were exposed and at-
tempts were made to fix them and move forward with the North American integra-
tion project (see Table 2).
In early 2000, lots of ideas for North America were circulating to inspire leaders 
to make bold strategic moves. The Mexican government and Canadian businesses in 
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particular expressed wishes for a deeper and broader integration of the region 
(Wikileaks, 2003; Clarkson and Banda, 2004; Daudelin, 2003; Capling and Nossal, 
2009; Brodie, 2012). Academics from the three countries also took a stand in the face 
of the erosion and deficits of regional governance (Pastor, 2001; Chambers and 
Smith, 2003; Hakim and Litan, 2002; Canadian Council of Chief Executives, 2003; 
Hughes, 2005). The tenth anniversary of nafta created momentum and a pretext for 
producing and debating alternative scenarios for the future of the continent (De la 
Reza, 2004; Weintraub, 2004; Nevaer, 2004; Aspe, Weld, and Manley, 2005; Hufbauer 
and Schott, 2005; Hughes, 2005; Noble, 2005; Cortés Campos, 2005). An effort was 
also made within the Mexican and Canadian governments to invent new approach-
es to cooperation in a bilateral or trilateral framework, respectively, the whole en-
chilada or the Vision 2020 proposal, and the common security perimeter initiative or rec-
ommendations made by the House of Commons Foreign Relations Committee in its 
report Partners in North America. Advancing Canada’s Relations with the United States and 
Mexico (2002).
The Security and Prosperity Partnership emerged in this historic setting out of 
frustration over pre-existing mechanisms of cooperation, dialogue, and dispute res-
olution, as a new approach to managing relations (Celorio, 2005; Sands, 2006; Gutiér-
rez Fernández, 2005). Of course, U.S. Americans, Mexicans, and Canadians also had 
a larger picture in mind: the state of regional competitiveness in the global economy 
and asymmetrical threats to public security. They were especially concerned about 
negative effects of U.S. security policy on trade operations and the national econo-
mies. They were also aware of China’s rapid rise in the world economy, and at the 
same time of the outdated nafta provisions, non-trade barriers that remained in 
place though the customs duties had been lifted (Leycegui Gardoqui, 2012; Rozen-
tal, 2006; Anderson and Sands, 2007; Garcia-Segovia de Madero, 2003; Benítez 
Manaut and Hristoulas, n.d.; Cespedes, 2008; Velazquez Flores and Schiavon, 2008). 
In the eyes of the leaders and their advisers, the existing bilateral and trilateral insti-
tutions could not deal with these issues or were too slow in their reactions. A new 
model of addressing common problems was needed.
the spp In response to the InstItutIonAl shortcomIngs 
of north AmerIcAn IntegrAtIon: propertIes And InternAl dynAmIcs
The spp was created in 2005 by the chief executives of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico in 
response as much as to the global economic and security situation as to the short-
comings of existing institutions and to the leaders’ personal legacy concerns. The spp 
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was also designed to circumvent any political discontentment and opposition –as 
such, it was a response to domestic political, legal, and cultural constraints– and in 
the belief that the challenges that North America was facing could be resolved with-
in executive powers and technocratic capabilities. 
Since 2005, the spp has changed over time as leaders’ involvement and attention 
faded away. The intensity of cooperation dwindled, and the agenda shrank. The story 
of the spp is a story of slow decline, not of a rise toward regional governance. The very 
hopeful and ambitious beginnings in 2005 and 2006 were followed by drifting in 
2007 and 2008 and the program’s unannounced death in 2009. 
Aside from the aforementioned changes in the spp lifespan, there were also dif-
ferences in the effectiveness and cooperation model for its two pillars, prosperity 
and security, as well as among various working groups. For example, on the security 
side, there were more work, and technical collaboration and dual bilateralism were 
upheld. On the prosperity side, more policy documents were produced, accompanied 
by the coordination of unilateral actions. The sphere of prosperity was also charac-
terized more often by a trilateral approach. 
Trying to define and describe the spp is a difficult task because finding general 
traits and patterns of behavior applicable to the whole agenda is almost impossible. 
It is even harder to evaluate the spp and avoid oversimplifications. There is tendency 
to call it a failure, but the reality is more complex and a grey area.
The spp did not address all the shortcomings of the North American institutional 
framework (politicization, weak law enforcement, bureaucratization). Three leaders 
decided to proceed with the spp and put aside the nafta system’s trade conflicts and 
institutional weaknesses with the knowledge that any greater reforms required ac-
tion from the legislatures. They would eventually need a lot of time when the situation 
demanded quick responses.
Furthermore, the relationship between already existing mechanisms of coopera-
tion and governance and the spp was also left untreated and unresolved in informal or 
formal ways. In consequence, those who participated in the spp had to handle multiple 
mechanisms and agendas that as a result debilitated their chances of success in the spp.
In many ways, the spp was a continuation of old patterns and plans of action. 
Once again, the chief principals met, discussed, and published joint statements or 
political declarations. Once again, experienced working groups met, but did not ac-
complish much. Once again, the business community to whom much was promised 
was getting more and more frustrated each year reiterating the same recommendations 
and receiving few tangible results. Again, Canada and Mexico tried to limit their 
neighbor’s unilateralism; and they learned that it is not so easy to do, because not 
only can the U.S. Congress cause problems, but uncoordinated executive agencies 
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can also act against the regional interests pronounced at the spp meetings. For exam-
ple, in case of Canada, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security created the West-
ern Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which discriminated against Canadian travelers 
who did not have passports to cross the U.S. border, as if commitment to spp priori-
ties did not exist. In case of Mexico, under the spp, transportation and trucking were 
debated, but the big elephant in the room, the “dispute over the access of Mexican 
trucks to U.S. soil,” put aside.2 That said, it is clear that the spp was a continuation of 
the power structure among the three countries that evolved from its patterns of co-
operation and communication practices.
Despite the fact that the spp resembles many other management frameworks al-
ready functioning in North America, there was an effort to improve effectiveness 
and speed up political cooperation. The novelty of the spp’s organization lies in the 
involvement in its structure of each country’s highest level of power.3 It was intend-
ed to break the bureaucratic (formal, lengthy, non-innovative) character of previous 
frameworks, because with the interest and attention of the leaders and their staffs, 
administrations work more effectively and quickly. The spp created a hybrid organi-
zation that included both a network and a hierarchy.
This new type of organization represented an advance toward greater effectiveness, 
but it also became the spp’s weakness. Since the agreements reached through the spp were 
non-binding declarations, only one way existed to demand action from bureaucracies, 
and this involved putting pressure on countries to comply (Interview with Mexican 
government officials, 2012; Roff, Krajnc and Clarkson, 2009; Craik, 2011).4 In the absence 
of that pressure, the bureaucrats lost the motivation to make an extra effort, and the 
whole the spp began to drift in the inertia of the old habits of diplomatic exchanges and 
periodic meetings that ended without specific and operationalized policy initiatives.
When at least one leader loses his/her interest in the spp, the whole initiative gets 
a lower profile in the hierarchy of priorities. In consequence, the morale of other ad-
ministrations can be affected. Since the U.S. exercises hegemony, when the president 
stops investing energy and capital in the spp, the whole endeavor ceases to function.
2  After years of non-compliance with international arbitration and discussions with Mexican officials, the 
U.S. government set up a trial program in 2007. Mexican trucks finally gained access to U.S. territory via 
the joint action of Congress and President Obama, who signed the bill for this pilot program, which then 
was canceled in 2009.
3  For more about the origins of the spp and the crucial role of a few people in White House’s National Secu-
rity Council, in Mexico’s President’s Office, and Canada’s Privy Council, be read the master’s thesis written 
by Steven Masson, “Upgrading North American Architecture through the Security and Prosperity Partner-
ship” (n.d.).  Interviewed Mexican officials also pointed out on many occasions that pressure from the chief 
executive office was very important in the first years of the SPP.
4  All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual 
agreement.
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In fact, this is what happened. Between 2005 and 2006, the oversight and pres-
sure of the White House National Security Council, Canada’s Privy Council, and 
Mexico’s President’s Office sped up domestic and international negotiations within 
the spp, and the deliverables were impressive.5 Since 2007, when both President 
Calderón and Prime Minister Harper demonstrated that the spp and trilateralism 
were not among their priorities, the spp begun to be managed by foreign relations 
departments and ministries instead of by the leaders’ close collaborators. In effect, 
the spp involved more discussion and meetings than actual policy-making or policy 
implementation. Later on, when President Obama did not want to continue policies 
of his predecessor, the spp was dropped from the agenda. 
As mentioned above, the spp suffered from some management shortcomings, 
the most pervasive of which was related to the way spp work was planned. In previous 
management frameworks, the work was driven by a series of meetings. Though this 
was supposed to be a strength, making the spp a more flexible and responsive mecha-
nism, it actually plunged it into a series of undefined situations. In the beginning, 
lots of issues were on the agenda, but after two years they shrank to four or five. The 
agenda set by the leaders was always formulated broadly, without giving the respec-
tive bureaucracies specific guidelines or practical expectations (Partnership of North 
America, 2006; U.S. General Printing Office Presidential Documents, 2005, 2007a, 
and 2008). The leaders gave them a list of needs to be satisfied, expecting that some-
thing would be done, that pressured the bureaucracies. The coordinators of the securi-
ty and prosperity agendas were responsible for clarifying and specifying goals, but 
they were vague in their recommendations (Government of Canada, 2005, 2007; U.S. 
Department of Commerce Archives, 2008a).
The bureaucracies of each country held long discussions, went on fact-finding 
missions, and shared information in order to find out what needed to be achieved to 
overcome challenges such as greater competition, safer borders, energy security, etc. 
Also during much of their joint work, they focused on defining vague concepts like 
security, prosperity, and quality of life in the North American context, and they discussed 
the domestic interests and capabilities of their respective federal agencies. This effort, 
though commendable, consumed a lot of time and made the spp less effective. 
Besides the broad, vague agenda and poorly specified goals, yet another problem 
was posed by weak monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The benchmarks and 
indicators of success were not well defined. For example, meetings and conferences 
5  Of course, many of the spp outputs during that period were low hanging fruits. Later on, new ideas and solu-
tions had be discussed, which required time and therefore slowed down the spp between 2007 and 2009. This 
was attributed to Canada’s lack of interest in Mexico and the fact that new proposals needed time to mature.
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were considered deliverables when the strategic objective was competitiveness or 
security and the tactical aims were harmonization of regulations or elimination of ob-
s tacles. Reports on the spp cited its accomplishments and achievements. However, 
the reports suggest that planning in the long and short term was chaotic.
Another weakness that did not help the spp live up to its ambitious aims was its 
lack of a proper budget. Only the U.S. and Canada requested financing for projects 
related to the spp; Mexico made a tacit pact not to ask Congress for funds explicitly 
earmarked for spp projects (Department of Finance Canada, 2008 and 2006; U.S. Sen-
ate, 2005a, 2006, 2007, and 2009; U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006).
In the sphere of regulation, an important part of spp cooperation, it was argued 
that money was not so necessary for introducing changes related to modernization 
and the expansion of the border structure. However, it is obvious that when you want 
to introduce new policies or strengthen the execution of existing ones, you need funds. 
By not making any financial commitments, the leaders and their ministers limited 
the chances of success, again sentencing the spp to be less productive and efficient. 
Another spp feature relates to how the North American agenda was treated by the 
governments, whether trilaterally or bilaterally (continuing the pattern of dual bilater-
alism). The researchers recognized three basic relationships in the region: U.S.-Mexico, 
U.S.-Canada, and Mexico-Canada, and they stressed that the trilateral relationship 
was still in statu nascendi (Clarkson and Banda, 2004; Pastor, 2005; Capling and Nossal, 
2009). The spp confirms the structural and historical tendencies of three distinct rela-
tionships rather than embodying a dramatic change in the trilateral love affair. 
By reiterating the trilateral dimension, spp events and documents tend to obscure 
the deeper reality of spp negotiations regarding both pillars of the agreement: prosper-
ity and security. Almost all discussions about security, except health security and 
emergency preparedness (which were held both bilaterally and trilaterally), were con-
vened bilaterally (US Department of Commerce, 2007; semarnat, 2012; cofemer, 2013; 
ifai, 2013, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2005). To the contrary, the pros-
perity agenda was managed more trilaterally. However, some issues only interested 
Mexico and others were only important for Canada. As a result bilateral negotiations 
reflected the discrepancies among the three countries’ the interests and visions (Inter-
view with Mexican government official, 2012; Wikileaks 2005a, 2005b, 2005c).
Often, when leaders and those responsible for the spp met, they did not hold tri-
lateral meetings. Instead the U.S. delegation held separate meetings with Mexico 
and Canada. In addition, if we take into consideration that many activities within 
the partnership framework were temporary (exchange of information, modernization 
of border infrastructure, management of border/transit programs, exercises and 
trainings), these collaborative efforts were practically all bilateral.
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Another feature of the spp was that it did not produce formal procedural guide-
lines or internal regulations. Those involved in it preferred proceeding this way be-
cause it helped them focus on getting things done and avoiding long negotiations on 
procedural arrangements. However, there was a consensus about the following prin-
ciples that organized their work:
1.  Refrain from actions that require the legislature’s approval (Interviews with 
Mexican government officials, 2012); 
2. Consult stakeholders, especially the business community;6
3. Pursue solutions based on research and/or that have been tested;7
4.  Three can talk; two can do (bilateralism is acceptable, everything does not 
have to be discussed and done trilaterally);8 and
5.  Start from “low hanging fruits,” and then move on to new issues and search 
for new solutions (Anderson and Sands, 2007; Martin, 2005; Moens, 2011, inter-
view with Mexican federal government officials, 2012).
The first, fourth, and fifth principles focus on issues that are feasible and, in con-
sequence, speed up cooperation. Principles two and three helped the three countries 
to achieve: 1) better-informed decisions made with access to the resources in other 
countries; and 2) greater transparency and predictability of regulatory practices that 
contribute to their expertise and promote best practices internationally, thus influ-
encing standards elsewhere. 
In relation to the inputs (human and financial resources, power relations, bu-
reaucratic constraints, organizational structure), the spp was very effective. It over-
6  All official spp websites posted an invitation to private and non-profit organizations to participate in con-
sultations about the spp process.  Respect for the business sector was institutionalized in the form of the 
North American Competitiveness Council, and also in the regular meetings of working group participants 
who sought advice and recommendations from stakeholders. This evidence was found, for example, in the 
records of the hearing before the Health Committee on June 4, 2007 in Canada’s 39th Parliament and was con-
firmed by my informants in Mexico who recalled that Mexican governments organized meetings with 
business leaders and academics..
7  The spp launched a couple of pilot projects to test new solutions and collaborative measures: evaluation of 
the the spp NA Pilot Project on Reducing Emissions from Vehicles and Engines http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/
ae-ve/2011-2012/1405/ec-com1405-en-es.htm; the Nexus Marine Pilot Project Evaluation Study http://
www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/reports-rapports/ae-ve/2006/nexus_mar-eng.html; the Trilateral Com -
mittee on Transborder Data flows ordered a survey on the negative effects of national regulations on trans-
border data flows http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic-ceac.nsf/eng/h_gv00520.html; Another study ordered 
by the  spp analyzed border infrastructure and the capacity of border agencies on the U.S.-Mexico border. It 
was developed by the Colegio de Frontera Norte, and the report was published in 2007 “U.S.-Mexico Ports 
of entry: a capacity analysis and recommendations for increased efficiency.”
8  See the footnotes 39 and 40 (cfr. Moens, 2009; Ackleson and Kastner, 2006: 207-232, Capling and Nossal, 
2009 ; Nossal, 2010).
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came a lot of deficiencies and managed to deliver some tangible outputs and results. 
However, compared to the complex needs and its ambitious goals, the spp’s accom-
plishments are not impressive. This is due to the problems with translating the broad 
strategic needs into operational goals, defining measurable indicators of success, 
and implementing weak evaluation practices. Also, the partnership was affected neg-
atively by shortcomings in leadership.
the spp: cooperAtIon/communIcAtIon devIce 
And regIonAl governAnce mechAnIsm
It appears that one of the foundations of the spp was a belief that a deeper under-
standing and knowledge of each other was crucial for moving on with the North 
American project. A lot of energy and resources were employed to strengthen and 
maintain communication and cooperation toward a common vision of which chal-
lenges North America was facing as an economic region and security space. The list 
of accomplishments for the spp and those who participated testify to the fact that many 
conferences, presentations, discussions, and exchanges of information were held.
In essence, there was too much talk, but not enough negotiating and decision-
making. As Canadian officials discussed in 2007, “We’re not at all at a stage of making 
any changes to regulations or anything. We’re basically at the stage of comparing ap-
proaches in the three countries, identifying differences where there are differences, 
and, where appropriate, trying to remove the differences” (Chaput, 2007).
Efforts included conferences, meetings, and sessions on each country’s legal 
framework. Representatives assessed how differences in each country’s regulations 
are harmful for the trade or regional security of another. They also discussed what 
practical opportunities existed for improving that situation and whether it was possi-
ble to do this with unilateral action, a memorandum of understanding, or by treaty.9 
During these learning meetings, best practices were shared and some were later im-
plemented in other countries or tested in joint exercises (Secretaría de Economía, 
2006a; Industry Canada, 2010; Martínez Bejarano, 2012; Legorreta Odorika, 2012).
If we study the evolution of some the spp initiatives, it becomes clear that many 
hours were spent on communication and building a common vision. However, they 
rarely led to formal negotiations, political declarations, or legal agreements (which 
9  This interpretation of the spp as another model of international cooperation, not a form of regional govern-
ance leading to integration, is also argued by Jimena Jiménez in “The Security and Prosperity Partnership: 
Made in North America Integration or Co-operation?” in Julián Castro Rea, ed., Our North America: Social 
and Political Issues beyond nafta, University of Alberta Press, 2012.
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are indicators of policy integration). For example, the story of e-commerce coopera-
tion demonstrates the usual practice of the spp. In 2005, the three countries produced 
the Framework of Common Principles for Electronic Commerce and committed to nation-
al action plans consisting of reviews of existing law, exchanges of good practices, 
and consultations with the business sector. In 2008, they published a joint Statement 
on the Free Flow of Information and Trade in North America, and in 2009 they established 
the Trilateral Committee on Transborder Flow of Data to work on regional responses 
to facilitate and secure data flows. During its short life, the committee commissioned 
a study on private sector needs regarding data-flow regulation. It also organized con-
ferences and workshops to disseminate knowledge of each country’s regimens. This 
case illustrates how much time was needed to address the 2005 promise to better 
regulate and harmonize electronic data transfers in business environments.  It shows 
once again how slowly the three bureaucracies operated together and how difficult 
it is to harmonize regulations or create a regional regimen.
Of course, the spp was not a perfect communication device; the coordination at 
the domestic and intergovernmental level of people working on the security agenda 
and those working on the prosperity agenda was far from ideal. They often did not 
know who was collaborating on other projects (Interview with Mexican federal gov-
ernment officials, 2012; House of Commons, 2007a). This compromised the cohe-
siveness of their endeavors. However, the spp was a necessary effort that sometimes 
successfully coordinated a complicated agenda to promote economic integration 
(Interview with Mexican government official, 2012). Those participating in the spp 
were also conscious of the complexities of North American integration and of issues 
of interdependence.  
In 2005, the leaders created several working groups within the spp (see Table 1). 
Informal networks of officials from the three countries met cyclically and kept in 
daily contact with each other. During the spp, additional working groups and forums 
were created, like the North American Competitiveness Council, the North Ameri-
can Aviation Trilateral, the Trilateral Committee on Transborder Data Flows, and the 
Laboratory and Surveillance Technical Working Group.
The partnership promoted cooperation and communication in North America 
by including provisions to promote greater dialogue in the many agreements it pro-
duced, among them, the Memorandum of Understanding between Canada and the 
U.S. It enhanced and strengthened the exchange of information and cooperative ac-
tivities on public health and safety protection related to the safety of consumer prod-
ucts. The U.S.-Canada agreement enabled the simultaneous exchange of informa-
tion between virtual national laboratory networks. The United States and Mexico 
signed an agreement to create advance notifications when consumer goods violated 
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one country’s safety standards or posed a danger to consumers. The U.S.-Canada 
agreement was a milestone in pipeline regulatory cooperation that increased 
compliance on data sharing, staff exchanges and joint training (Government of Can-
ada, 2005; Secretaría de Economía, 2006a; U.S. Department of Colmmerce Archives, 
2008b; Savage, 2010).
The spp promoted routine communication and cooperation and the exchange of 
liaison officers and fostered the maintenance of their posts abroad. For example, rep-
resentatives from all three countries’ public health agencies participated in an exchange. 
The National Targeting Center (ntc) in the United States and the National Risk As-
sessment Centre (nrac) in Canada also exchanged officers.
Examples of the important role of the spp as a device for enhancing communica-
tion lived on even after the partnership ceased to exist. For example, some of the net-
works remained in operation or even expanded. In 2011, the U.S. and Canada formed 
the Regulatory Cooperation Council and signed another initiative, Beyond the Bor-
der, which represented a shared vision for perimeter security and economic competi-
tiveness. Mexico and the U.S. also established the High Level Regulatory Coopera-
tion Council and developed broad networks for the implementation of the Mérida 
Initiative (White House, n.d.; Savage, 2011a, 2011b). Participants who worked on the 
spp North American anti-pandemic framework continued operating, and in 2012 they 
published an updated strategy. Probably the spp’s biggest achievement in terms of 
promotion of regional cooperation and dialogue is the institutionalization and sur-
vival of the North American Leaders Summit. This forum, though not very produc-
tive and appreciated by the leaders themselves, provides a guaranteed opportunity 
to meet with the U.S. president, whose time is precious and limited, an opportunity that 
many might be jealous of (Interview with Mexican government official, 2013). 
The most basic type of cooperation was mutual assistance in law enforcement. 
The spp increased the intensity of information and intelligence exchange related to 
combating terrorism, money laundering, and people smuggling. 
Often the partnership’s programs were developed to test new solutions before 
they were applied. Another category of cooperation refers to pilot projects, like the 
Canada-U.S. land pre-clearance pilot at the Thousand Islands Bridge, the nexus-Ma-
rine pilot in Windsor-Detroit, and the Pilot Project on Reducing Emissions from Ve-
hicles and Engines. These were exploratory programs to strengthen trust and to test 
new technologies and operational arrangements. 
Some types of collaboration were temporary, and the countries used them to 
run joint assessments and evaluations. For example, the Canada-U.S. Public Security 
Technical Program completed a comprehensive Coordinated Risk Assessment, and 
the Integrated Border Enforcement Team also ran the Threat Assessment. Canada, 
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Mexico, and the United States undertook a comprehensive analysis of various emis-
sions inventories and tested emissions estimation methodologies for nine energy-
generating facilities. Temporary cooperation efforts were carried out during natural 
disasters: the U.S. helped Mexico in 2007 during the floods in Tabasco and Chiapas, 
and Mexico helped the U.S. during the 2007 California wildfires. Other short-term 
cooperation took place when Canada and the United States worked together with 
Mexico to provide technical assistance and training opportunities as Mexico built a 
Bio-Safety Level-3 National Laboratory for inclusion in the Health and Human Ser-
vices/Center for Disease Control Laboratory Response Network. 
This last example was a case of international technical assistance. Similar coop-
eration occurred when the U.S. pursued greater nuclear detection and safety in co-
operation with the governments of Canada and Mexico. It carried out a program called 
the Mega Ports Initiative (El Universal, 2007; U.S. Department of Commerce, 2008b; 
U.S. Gao, 2012). Thanks to this program, the U.S. provided and placed radioactive de-
tection equipment in Mexican and Canadian seaports where the majority of goods 
enter the region. Other examples of this kind of cooperation involved bilateral pro-
jects such as the Canada-U.S. Chemical Assessment and Management Program (epa, 
2008a, 2008b), a five-year program to harmonize automated commercial information 
systems, and the U.S.-Mexico Alien Smuggler Prosecutions Program, a pilot program 
in El Paso and Chicago for the safe, humane, and orderly repatriation of Mexican na-
tionals (Government of Canada, 2005).
Within the spp, another form of cooperation developed that had a strictly technical, 
practical, limited scope of action. I am referring to joint policing of the U.S.-Canadian 
border. Other examples of collaborative initiatives included the Shared Cruise Ship In-
spections Project, the joint verification of vessels entering the St. Lawrence Seaway.
Though it may appear that communication and cooperation in the spp went 
smoothly, this was not always the case. For example, between 2005 and 2007, Cana-
da and the United States negotiated an initiative to modernize and expand border 
infrastructure for the Ontario/Buffalo Peace Bridge and for the possible joint admin-
istration of a new port of entry. The two parties could not agree on a series of issues. 
As a result, the dhs dropped out of the talks (U.S. Gao, 2008).
The spp was rarely a forum for making rules. A review of its outputs demonstrates 
that the three countries agreed to introduce or promote general all-encompassing rules 
that were successfully implemented only a few times.
Some analysts interpret the spp as a form of regional governance (Kirton and Gue-
bert, 2010; Roff, Krajnc, and Clarkson, 2009; Anderson and Sands, 2007; Belanger, 2010; 
Gilbert, 2007; Grondin and De Larrinaga, 2009). The policy-making process can be un-
derstood as a sequence of stages: 1) problem identification, 2) agenda setting, 3) policy 
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formulation, 4) policy adoption, 5) policy implementation, 6) policy evaluation, and 7) 
policy change or termination. These analyses ended up examining only the first four 
stages while overlooking whether the spp policies were implemented or not. I argue 
that even if the intention of spp statements was to establish governing principles for the 
region, it still needs to be proved that the administrations followed up the declarations 
and acted upon them. 
If the spp had worked as governance device, it would be easy to determine its in-
fluence. It is difficult to link decisions made by the spp with specific policy changes in 
any of the three countries. Because the partnership functioned in concert with other 
mechanisms such as Smart Borders Cooperation, nafta institutions, and the Canada-
Mexico Partnership, it is complicated to define its influence. How can it be separated 
from the influence of other political processes? One oft-cited spp accomplishment is the 
changes in rules of origin, a development actually produced by the negotiation pro-
cess set up by nafta. Another accomplishment publicized in spp materials is the border 
infrastructure upgrade, which was a continuation of the Smart Border agreements. 
In conclusion, the spp regulated bilateral and trilateral relations rather than reg-
ulating issues on the spp agenda. However, at some point it also functioned as a gov-
ernance mechanism that shaped the lives of people in North America.
The spp bureaucrats were aware of the institutional and cultural constraints of 
their actions. They knew that they were limited not only by domestic appetites and 
preferences but also by other international legal obligations. They reached formal, 
legal agreements only when they were sure that it would be accepted by the legisla-
ture. They were limited to making small, incremental steps like increasing and nor-
malizing the hours of operation of border and customs agents
The rules and principles expressed in spp documents had different origins. Some 
were taken from multilateral recommendations or treaties, while others were devel-
oped by the spp in a regional context or as a result of the acceptance of U.S. standards. 
For example, in the case of electronic data flows and intellectual property protection, 
the spp referred to oecd or wto recommendations. In the matter of natural disasters 
and public health emergencies, the three countries created mechanisms, protocols, 
and action plans related to North American circumstances. In many instances, espe-
cially in the sphere of security, Mexico and Canada had to adjust to U.S. standards; for 
example, the regulations related to the flow of people and goods across both borders.
The regulations, principles, standards, and guidelines produced by the spp had 
different impacts on various subjects. Mainly, they organized operations of the three 
governments and their bureaucracies. Sometimes, indirectly, they also influenced 
particular sectors of the economy (steel, energy, the illegal market of counterfeits, 
airlines) or society (passengers, commuters, counterfeiters of goods). They rarely trans-
33
The SecuriTy and ProSPeriTy ParTnerShiP
eSSayS
formed the way people in the three countries live (for example, consumers of elec-
tronic goods could buy washing machines and tv sets produced according to a com-
mon North American standard). Often, they had only a temporary effect, such as with 
populations affected by natural disasters and pandemics.
The rules promoted in the spp documents were flexible, leaving a lot of room for 
interpretation, and allowing countries to implement them as they wished. They were 
general, they were not legally binding, and no sanctions accompanied them. Regula-
tions were limited in scope. The broad agenda only produced a few issues that 
reached the stage of trilateral policy-making (pandemic and emergency management, 
intellectual property, energy, regulatory cooperation).
The degree to which the particular spp documents affected the three countries 
varied. Changes promoted by the spp most often affected Canada and Mexico. Some 
rules were more vigorously implemented in Mexico, others in Canada. For example 
Canada did not take intellectual property protection strategy as seriously as Mexico 
did. On the other hand, Canada and the U.S. were very engaged in common energy 
policy. Because of constitutional constraints, Mexico could not be as involved in cre-
ating and enforcing a common regime of North America. 
Only a few topics on the spp agenda were effectively introduced in the three coun-
tries: 1) emergency and public health preparedness, 2) intellectual property protection, 
3) regulatory cooperation, and 4) energy. None of these issues were treated exclusively 
in trilateral negotiations, and even if there was trilateral cooperation, some aspects of 
these problems were still discussed bilaterally.
Within the spp framework, the North American Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
was developed and announced for the first time in 2007 and the second time in 2012. 
Bureaucrats also developed the North America approach to bovine spongiform en-
cephalopathy (bse) in 2005. Along with the U.S. and Canada, Mexico and the U.S., 
and Mexico and Canada updated old bilateral protocols and agreements and negoti-
ated new ones. Based on these commitments, new networks of researchers, first res-
ponders, and public safety agencies formed and, in cases of crisis, cooperated. This 
occurred during the swine flu outbreak in Mexico when laboratories from Canada 
and the U.S. assisted the Mexican government and counterparts in the diagnosis and 
development of a vaccine.
The Intellectual Property Action Strategy was negotiated in 2006 and declared 
in 2007 at the Montebello Summit as one of the spp accomplishments (Pedrero, 2006). 
In Mexico, it was taken very seriously, and the government started to implement the 
National Agreement against Pirated Goods and the Usurpation Plan (Procuraduría 
General de la República, n.d.). Law enforcement and customs agents received training 
from their U.S. counterparts about identifying fake goods. The issue of counterfeit 
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products was raised in public educational programs, and awareness-raising campaigns 
were launched in 2007 and 2008. The programs increased detection and acquisition 
of pirated goods, and consumption of illegal software dropped slightly (Lombera 
2008a and 2008b; El mañana, 2007).
Regulatory cooperation definitely had more influence on the way regulatory 
institutions perform in the three countries than on their citizens. Within the spp, bu-
reaucrats worked on general norms to guide regulatory practices bilaterally and trilat-
erally. In 2007, the first trilateral document was announced by the leaders: the Regu-
latory Cooperation Framework. The following year, the officials collaborated further 
to establish the principles of their regulatory coordination. As a result, they produced 
three documents: the Common Regulatory Principles, the Initial Work Plan Regulatory 
Cooperation Framework and the Illustrative Inventory of Best Practices. As a conse-
quence of these efforts, transnational networks of agencies from the three countries 
were solidified and the practice of early alert became routine. Broad discussions about 
harmonization were undertaken, and some were more successful than others (for 
example, negotiations about universal pesticides standards produced no results).
Nevertheless, in some cases, the harmonization of regulations worked. Exam-
ples include the Harmonized Air Navigation Systems; an arrangement on the Use of 
Care Symbols on Textiles and Apparel Goods Labels; reciprocal recognition of con-
tainers used for the transportation of dangerous goods; energy performance standards 
for key household appliances and consumer products, such as freezers, refrigera-
tors, and room air conditioners; harmonization of standards in accordance with the 
World Organization for Animal Health to allow for the export of Canadian and U.S. 
American breeding cattle to Mexico.
Regulatory cooperation is still a high priority for North America because it is un-
derstood as the main measure for creating greater competitiveness and freer trade in 
the region. The spp laid a foundation for this collaboration, which was necessary for more 
specific and sector-oriented talks. Economic regulatory cooperation was carried by tri-
lateral and bilateral working groups and resulted in the signing of two documents: the 
Common Regulatory Principles in 2007 and the Regulatory Cooperation Framework 
in 2008. After the SPP stopped operating, Canada and the United States, as well as 
Mexico and the United States, created separate Regulatory Cooperation Councils. 
The subject of energy security and the continental market was discussed trilat-
erally within the spp. These discussions produced the Trilateral Agreement for Coop-
eration in Energy Science and Technology, signed in 2007 and entering into force the 
same year. On the bilateral level, the United States and Canada signed an agreement 
that was a milestone in pipeline regulatory cooperation. It increased compliance 
with data sharing, staff exchanges, and joint training. In turn, the United States and 
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Mexico formalized their clean energy and climate change agreements in 2009, but 
these cannot be included as part of the spp deliverables.  
The spp had an impact on trade liberalization and the organization of the nafta 
economic space because it speeded them up, according to Ministry of the Economy 
officials interviewed. Negotiations took place related to new nafta rules of origin, 
changes introduced in 2005 that covered approximately US$30 billion in annual tri-
lateral trade. An additional set of changes, agreed to in 2007, reduced export-related 
transaction costs by approximately US$100 billion in annual trilateral trade. Here 
the spp was not a source of normative change because the talks were part of an ongo-
ing process programmed by nafta. However, the spp framework, with pressure from 
the chief executives’ offices, pushed the bureaucrats to advance quickly in their 
negotiations. 
conclusIon
This article focuses on the policy-making process mechanics and dynamics, in con-
trast to other publications that present interests and divergent policy visions as ex-
planatory variables of regional integration in North America, in order to enrich and 
complement the existing literature. Therefore, it does not give straightforward an-
swers to the questions of which issues on the agenda are more prone to regionaliza-
tion because of converging interests. On the contrary, it puts the emphasis, inspired 
by Leon Lindberg´s theories, on the makings of the policy at the regional level, to 
predict whether there will be further policy and political integration within the past 
and current bureaucratic structures of regional cooperation. In consequence, this 
analysis argues that the spp as a management framework tried to overcome the defi-
ciencies of previous management arrangements, as well as of dual bilateralism. It 
produced mixed outcomes and results for North American regionalism. 
Although, thanks to certain organizational innovations and principally its hy-
brid nature (networked and hierarchical organization), the spp was temporarily able 
to boost the efficiency and effectiveness of regional cooperation and policy making, 
it did not leave lasting marks on the regional governance landscape. To some extent, 
its operational principles enabled politicians and bureaucrats to proceed more quickly 
and in a less politicized fashion, but only during the first year of its existence (2005/2006), 
and in a certain few issue areas (for example, pandemic threats, e-commerce, border 
infrastructure, protection of intellectual property).
As the article demonstrates, the weaknesses in the spp management framework, 
its broad and ambiguous agenda, and the lack of adequate evaluation and monitor-
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ing to assess progress curbed its chances of success in the form of expanding policy 
integration and lasting political integration of the region.
At the same time, it was proved that Mexico, the U.S., and Canada addressed 
different elements of the spp agenda (problems and objectives) in varied ways (inten-
sified communication, temporary cooperation, joint regulations, durable policy chang-
es). It is difficult to determine that some issues always fostered trilateral cooperation 
and others were treated exclusively bilaterally. Often general principles in some 
policy area were approached at a trilateral level and details or concrete initiatives 
were developed bilaterally. 
The spp functioned as a communication/cooperation device that facilitated in-
teractions and joint programs and promoted dialogue in the region in times of con-
flict and temporary crisis.  
The other role of the spp was as a governance mechanism, a forum for develop-
ing new rules, principles to organize and govern intergovernmental relations, and, 
to a much lesser extent, the way people lived in North America. The governance prac-
tices retained a lot of autonomy in each of the three countries in terms of how they 
implemented general guidelines produced by the spp. It also maintained the new re-
gionalist character of North America by promoting the combination of U.S. multilat-
erally and trilaterally originated norms. 
As far as the regional project in North America is concerned, the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership exposed the fact that integration driven by the bureaucrats is 
not going to succeed in producing greater policy and political integration. This type 
of regionalism is characteristic to the North American space, and the spp is merely a 
continuation of the three governments’ old habits and patterns of management prac-
tices. It leads to the conclusion that strong obstacles of a cultural, social, and political 
nature must exist that cannot be overcome by the bureaucrats and politicians.
It can also be argued that due to the disruptions and inconsistencies inherent to 
the national bureaucracies (due to the election cycles and domestic politics), dia-
logue and cooperation can suffer some discontinuities –as a result, creating joint 
policies and strategies, creating broader consensus about North America can take a 
lot of time and energy–; therefore, it would be very difficult to build and acquire the 
common vision, ideals, and principles necessary for deeper regional integration. 
The spp also showed that as a regional governance mechanism (specifically net-
work structures of working groups), it was very weak in producing lasting effects 
due to the lack of proper resources, dependence on domestic enforcement measures, 
and poor monitoring. This leads to the conclusion that a North American model of 
regionalism without greater institutionalization will not be a stable and continuous 
process toward policy integration on a regional scale. It will be a chain of sporadic 
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incidents of greater cooperation and policy convergence in specific issue areas when 
the priorities and interest converge between the top echelons of power in the three 
countries, separated by longer periods of diplomatic exchanges calculated to main-
tain the relationship.
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